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Abstract
This paper develops a framework for the quantitative analysis of individual income dynamics, mobility and welfare.
Individual income is assumed to follow a stochastic process with two (unobserved) components, an i.i.d. component
representing measurement error or transitory income shocks and an AR(1) component representing persistent changes
in income. We use a tractable consumption-saving model with labor income risk and incomplete markets to relate
income dynamics to consumption and welfare, and derive analytical expressions for income mobility and welfare as
a function of the various parameters of the underlying income process. The empirical application of our framework
using data on individual incomes from Mexico provides striking results. Much of measured income mobility is
driven by measurement error or transitory income shocks and therefore (almost) welfare-neutral. A smaller part
of measured income mobility is due to either welfare-reducing income risk or welfare-enhancing catching-up of low-
income individuals with high-income individuals, both of which have economically significant effects on social welfare.
Decomposing mobility into its fundamental components is thus seen to be crucial from the standpoint of welfare
evaluation.
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I. Introduction
Individual income dynamics characterize society in important ways. The degree to which individu-
als move across different sections of the income distribution is often summarized by one parameter,
income mobility. Indeed, income mobility is probably the single most important indicator of in-
dividual income dynamics used in public policy discussions.1 Income mobility is important as it
informs us about the opportunities afforded by society to escape one’s origins.2 At the same time,
mobility may also be driven by variability in incomes that reflect the risk to which individuals are
exposed in the economy.3 In this paper, we develop an analytical framework for the estimation and
welfare-theoretic evaluation of individual income dynamics that takes into account these different
drivers of income mobility. In addition, we provide an application of our framework using individual
income data from Mexico that yields striking results: Much of measured income mobility is driven
by measurement error or transitory income shocks and therefore (almost) welfare-neutral. A smaller
part of measured income mobility is due to either welfare-reducing income risk or welfare-enhancing
catching-up of low-income individuals with high-income individuals, both of which have economi-
cally significant effects on social welfare. Decomposing mobility into its fundamental components
is thus crucial from the standpoint of welfare evaluation.
The literature on income mobility has often focused on two important questions: the quanti-
tative/empirical measurement of the extent and nature of the change in individual incomes and,
separately, the social-welfare-theoretic evaluations of such changes.4 Two methodological issues
1In a developing country context, see, for example, a flagship publication of the World Bank in 2012, “Economic
Mobility and the Rise of the Middle Class,” that focuses on the income mobility in Latin America. For the US, the
New York Times article “Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs,” by Jason deParle (Jan 04,2012) describes
the importance of economic mobility for the upcoming presidential election.
2See, for instance, Shorrocks (1978), Lillard and Willis (1978), Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992),
Danziger and Gottschalk (1998) and Benabou and Ok (2001a, 2001b).
3See again Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992).
4For the former, see Lillard and Willis (1978), Shorrocks (1978), Geweke, Marshal and Zarkin (1986), Conlisk
(1990) and Fields and Ok (1996). For the latter, see, Atkinson (1983), Markandya (1982, 1984), Conlisk (1989),
Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992), Dardononi (1993), and Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002). Additionally,
the discussion over suitable social (income) mobility measures (indices), which may be used to evaluate mobility
given the pattern of individual income changes in society, constitutes a very well researched area that has generated
a number of important contributions in recent years. See Fields and Ok (1996) for a survey discussion.
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have arisen in this area. First, the parametric formulations used in the measurement of income
changes are not easily used as inputs to the quantitative welfare-theoretic analysis, thereby consti-
tuting a problematic gap between these two literatures. Furthermore, as the literature has often
pointed out, the measurement of dynamic income changes is itself confronted by (at least) the
following two problems. First, income data are subject to measurement error and, second, a sig-
nificant proportion of the observed income changes may be simply temporary in nature - resulting,
typically, in an overestimation of the relevant mobility in income (Lillard and Willis (1978) Solon
(2001), Luttmer (2002), Fields et al (2003), Glewwe (2004), McKenzie (2004)). This is also impor-
tant from the perspective of welfare analysis, as measurement error has no effect on workers’ welfare
and transitory shocks to income are perhaps easily smoothed out, resulting in very small welfare
effects. In addition, welfare analysis is confronted by an additional challenge. Since individual
utility is postulated as taking consumption rather than income as its argument, its direct valuation
requires reliable data on individual consumption levels, which are often unavailable for developing
countries. To use the more easily available data on incomes, a theoretical framework is required
that translates the estimated income dynamics into consumption changes taking into account the
institutional constraints individual agents face.
In this paper, we develop a tractable analytical framework to study income mobility that pro-
vides a close link between the welfare theory and the empirical methodology used in the measure-
ment of the income dynamics, thereby helping to bridge the gap between these literatures. At
the same time, this framework overcomes many of the methodological problems that we have just
discussed. We note, at the outset, that our focus is on income mobility within individual lifetimes
(intra-generational mobility). We postulate (Section II) that individuals face a stochastic income
process that is highly parameterized, but, following much of the literature, is sufficiently elaborate
to distinguish between changes in income resulting from trend growth and other predictable factors
and changes in income that are unpredictable. The unpredictable part of income change, in turn,
has two components, one first degree autoregressive (AR(1)) component reflecting persistent shocks
to income and another component that is i.i.d and captures transitory shocks and measurement
error in the income data. We show how income mobility, measured in relation to the correlation
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of incomes over time,5 relates to the various parameters of the underlying income process. We
also discuss how these parameters can be estimated using individual income data and econometric
techniques that exploit both the longitudinal and repeated cross-sections features of our data set
on individual incomes from Mexico (Sections III-V).6
Finally, we use a tractable consumption-saving model with labor income risk and incomplete
markets (Section VI) that yields closed-form solutions for equilibrium consumption and welfare
as a function of the preference and income parameters. This theoretical framework, based on the
work of Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Krebs (2007), focuses on the persistent component
of labor income and abstracts from the i.i.d component, an abstraction motivated by results in the
literature demonstrating that workers can effectively self-insure against transitory income shocks,
as we have already mentioned.7 One of the main insights of this literature is that in equilibrium
consumption responds one-for-one to permanent income shocks.8 In this paper, we exploit this
property of equilibrium consumption to derive an explicit formula for social welfare as function of
the underlying income parameters.
The analytical framework we develop in this paper has the merit of linking income dynamics,
income mobility and social welfare in a simple and transparent manner − allowing for a clearer
5Specifically, we use a quite basic and familiar measure, the Hart Index, which is the complement of the correlation
between the logarithm of incomes over times (see Hart (1981) and Shorrocks (1993)). As Fields and Ok (1996) discuss,
however, the literature has recently made important advances in studying the “multi-faceted concept” of mobility
and a number of different theoretical measures, each capturing a different aspect of mobility have been introduced.
We have no contribution to make to this discussion and simply use the Hart Index as our basic measure of mobility.
6For an interesting exercise which compares results on poverty vulnerability (the propensity to move into poverty)
obtained using panel data on incomes with those obtained repeated cross-sections instead and finds that model
parameters recovered from pseudo-panels approximate reasonably well those estimated directly from a true panel,
see Bourguignon, Goh and Kim (2006)
7See, for example, Aiyagari (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Levine and Zame (2002) and Section III for
further discussion of the issue of transitory income shocks. Clearly, in the case of measurement error there is even
more compelling reason to neglect the i.i.d. component in the welfare analysis. We should also note that while we
consider self-insurance against persistent income shocks, we do not model any alternative schemes that may provide
insurance against variations in persistent income. We believe this characterization to be closer to that of developing
economies, but this analysis would be relevant in any contexts where such (social) insurance schemes are absent.
8Moreover, Krebs (2007) shows that even in the case of persistent, but not necessarily permanent, income shocks
(AR(1) process with auto-correlation coefficient less than one) consumption still responds one-for-one to income
shocks if there are costs of financial intermediation that generate a sufficiently large spread between borrowing rate
and lending rate.
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analytical and quantitative discussion of these interrelated concepts, and specifically the role of
income variability, than has generally been possible in the past. We discuss in detail how differ-
ent determinants of measured income mobility may have quite different implications for welfare.
Specifically, we show that the auto-correlation coefficient of the AR(1) process (the catching-up pa-
rameter) measures “good mobility” in the sense that a reduction in this parameter increases both
mobility and welfare. In contrast, social welfare is (almost) unaffected by measurement error or
transitory income shocks even though mobility increases with the variance of the i.i.d. component
of labor income. Finally, the variance of persistent income shocks (income risk) increases mobility,
but decreases social welfare. This implies that two societies with the same initial distribution of
income and the same level of measured income mobility and aggregate growth may experience
quite different social welfare changes depending upon the different combinations of the underlying
income parameters.
We present a quantitative implementation of our framework that underscores the importance
of decomposing income dynamics into its components, as we have discussed. Specifically, an ap-
plication using data on individual incomes from Mexico yields striking results. Most of measured
income mobility is driven by measurement error or transitory income shocks and therefore (almost)
welfare-neutral, and only a small part of measured income mobility is due to either welfare-reducing
income risk or welfare-enhancing catching-pup of low-income individuals with high-income individu-
als. However, despite the small mobility effects, (idiosyncratic) persistent income risk has significant
negative effects on social welfare – eliminating or insuring it would generate welfare gains that are
equivalent to an increase in lifetime consumption by about 10 percent even if workers are only
moderately risk-averse (log-utility).9 Eliminating the catch-up of low income individuals with high
income individuals yields a loss in social welfare of similar magnitude. Decomposing mobility into
its fundamental components is thus seen to be crucial from the standpoint of welfare evaluation.
break
9In comparison, for the same preference parameters, Lucas (2003) computes welfare cost of aggregate consumption
fluctuations in the US that are two orders of magnitude smaller. Thus, even though our estimates of persistent income
risk seem small when measured mobility is the yardstick, their welfare effect is large indeed.
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II. Income and Mobility
II.1. Income Process
Consider a large number of workers indexed by i. For notational ease, we focus on one cohort of
workers who enter the labor market for the first time in period t = 0 so that t = 0, 1, . . . stands
for both calendar time and age (experience) of the worker. Let yit stand for the labor income of
worker i in period t. Following a longstanding tradition in micro-econometrics, we postulate that
the log of yit is a random variable that is the sum of two components, a persistent component, ωit,
and a transitory component, ηit.
10 In addition, we set the mean of lnyit to µ. In short, we have:
log yit = ωit + ηit + µ . (1)
The persistent component, ωit, follows an AR(1) process
ωi,t+1 = ρωit + ǫi,t+1 , (2)
where ρ is a parameter measuring the persistence of shocks. The term ǫ denotes a stochastic
innovation to labor income, which we assume to be i.i.d. over time and across individuals. We
further assume that the transitory component of labor income, ηit, is i.i.d. over time and across
individuals. Moreover, ηit and ǫi,t+n are uncorrelated for all t and n. All random variables are
normally distributed so that labor income is log-normally distributed. More specifically, we assume
that ǫit ∼ N(0, σ2ǫ ), ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η), and ωi0 ∼ N(0, σ2ω0).
Equations (1) and (2) together imply that:
ln yit = ρ
tωi0 +
t−1∑
n=0
ρt−n−1ǫi,n+1 + ηit + µ . (3)
Thus, labor income in period t is determined by initial condition, ω0, and stochastic changes, the
latter being represented by the transitory shocks, η, and permanent shocks, ǫ. From (3) and our
assumptions about ǫ, η, and ω0 it follows that expected labor income is E[lnyit] = µ and labor
10See Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and Carroll and Samwick (1997) for similar specifications and Baker and
Solon (2003) for a detailed discussion.
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income uncertainty before ωi0 is known is given by
var[lnyit] =
{
ρ2tσ2ω0 + σ
2
η +
1−ρ2t
1−ρ2
σ2ǫ if ρ 6= 1
σ2ω0 + σ
2
η + tσ
2
ǫ if ρ = 1
. (4)
As we have mentioned earlier, our study examines income mobility within individual lifetimes,
i.e., intra-generational income mobility.11 From (2), the parameter ρmeasures persistency of income
and thus (1− ρ) measures the extent to which individuals with low levels of income “initially” will
catch up with individuals with high income. In our context, the “initial” period corresponds to
the time of entry into the work force after the completion of formal education. Since labor income
may vary initially for equivalent individuals, catching-up in this context measures the extent to
which individuals with initially low incomes catch up to those with initially high incomes.12 In the
terminology of the growth literature, it measures convergence.13
II.2. Mobility
As noted in the introduction, our empirical measure of income mobility between 0 and t, which we
denote by mt, is the Hart index, defined as the complement of the correlation in (log) incomes at
0 and t (see Shorrocks (1993)):
mt = 1− corr(lnyi0, lnyit) (5)
= 1− cov(lnyi0, lnyit)
σlnyi0σlnyit
,
where we have used the notation σlnyi0 =
√
var[lnyi0] and σlnyit =
√
var[lnyit]. Using our income
11For recent work on intra-generational mobility, see Antman and McKenzie (2007), Cuesta and Pizzolitto (2010),
Dang et. al. (2011), and Cruces et. al (2011).
12In this theoretical section, our discussion relates to initial income differences and subsequent mobility between
ex-ante identical individuals. In our discussion of empirical methodology and in our empirical application to Mexican
data, we will study mobility between observationally equivalent individuals. That is to say, we examine income
differences and mobility in residual income after conditioning for the standard determinants of income such as
education and experience.
13To see this, suppose ρ < 1. In this case, we have convergence towards the “steady state”: E[lnyit|ωi0] → µ.
Let ∆0 = lnyi0 − d¯ be the initial distance from the steady state and ∆t = lnyit − d¯ be the distance in period t.
We can then define the time, T , it takes to get halfway towards the steady state, which is simply the solution to
∆T /∆0 = 1/2. Using the expression for ∆T and ∆0, it is straightforward to see that T is increasing in ρ for ρ < 1,
that is, an increase in ρ reduces the speed of convergence.
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specification from the previous section, we find the following expression for the co-variance:
cov(lnyi0, lnyit) = cov(ωi0 + ηi0, ρ
tωi0 +
t−1∑
n=0
ρt−n−1ǫi,n+1 + ηit + µ) (6)
= ρtσ2ω0
Using (3) and (6), we find the following expression for income mobility:14
mt =


1 − ρ
tσ2ω0√
σ2ω0
+σ2η
√
ρ2tσ2ω0
+σ2η+
1−ρ2t
1−ρ2
σ2ǫ
if ρ 6= 1
1 − σ
2
ω0√
σ2ω0
+σ2η
√
σ2ω0
+σ2η+tσ
2
ǫ
if ρ = 1
. (7)
Equation (7) defines income mobility as a function of the parameters of interest, σ2ǫ , σ
2
η, and ρ.
It is straightforward to show that mobility is increasing in the volatility parameters σ2ǫ and σ
2
η. This
is intuitive as an increase in the variance of income shocks increases the variability of individual
incomes, lowering the correlation between incomes across time, thus increasing mobility.
Importantly, income mobility is decreasing in ρ if either t is small and σ2ω0 < σ
2
η + σ
2
ǫ or t is
large and σ2ω0 < σ
2
ǫ /(1− ρ2):
∂mt
∂σ2ǫ
> 0 ,
∂mt
∂σ2η
> 0 ,
∂mt
∂ρ
< 0 . (8)
Intuitively, any increase in ρ increases income persistence, reducing the catching-up effect and
therefore reducing mobility. Note that both conditions σ2ω0 < σ
2
η + σ
2
ǫ and σ
2
ω0
< σ2ǫ /(1 − ρ2) are
satisfied in our empirical application (see section V).
III. Econometric Implementation
The discussion in the preceding sections has described how the different parameters of the income
process (σ2ω0 , σ
2
ǫ , σ
2
η and ρ) affect mobility. To get to a quantitative assessment of these linkages,
we turn next to the methodology and data used to estimate these parameters.
14For ρ < 1, the ω-process has a stationary distribution. If we choose as initial distribution this stationary
distribution, the ω-process becomes stationary with σ2ωt = σ
2
ω0
= σ2ǫ/(1 − ρ
2). In this case the mobility expression
(7) reduces to mt = 1− ρ
t/
(
1 + σ2η/σ
2
ǫ
)
.
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III.1. Estimation
We continue to assume that log labor income, ln yit, is specified as in (1). We further assume
that the deterministic mean component, µ, depends on xit = (x
′
it, zit), where zit denotes the age of
worker i in year t and x′it is vector of observable individual characteristics beyond age (education,
education2, gender). We also make the functional form assumption µt(x
′
it, zit) = λt + λ(x
′) · x′it +∑
z λ(z)δ(zit), where λt is a constant that varies by calendar time period (thus absorbing the
effects of macroeconomic factors such as aggregate productivity growth and aggregate economic
fluctuations on income), λ(x′) is a vector of coefficients for the vector of worker characteristics x′,
and δ(zit) are age-dummies. Thus, log labor income can be written as:
lnyit = λt + λ(x
′) · xit +
∑
z
λ(z)δ(zit) + vit (1
′)
vit = ωit + ηit .
Equation (1’) resembles a typical Mincer specification for labor income for which the residual,
vit, is the sum of two unobserved stochastic components, ωit and ηit. As in Carroll and Samwick
(1995), we first use equation (1’) to estimate the residuals vit and then use these estimated residuals
to estimate, in a second step, the parameters of interest. As noted above, this implies, importantly,
that our mobility measure relates to residual income v rather than unconditional income lny.
For notational simplicity, assume that all individuals i “are born” in period t = 0, so that t and
z simultaneously stand for age of the individual and calendar time. Equations (1) and (2) which
describe our labor income process imply that the the change in residual income variance with age
is given by:
V ar[viz] = var[(ωiz + ηiz)]
= σ2η + ρ
2zσ2ω0 +
1− ρ2z
1− ρ2 σ
2
ǫ (4
′)
(4’) links the changes in cross sectional residual income variances over for any age cohort z with
our parameters of interest. Unfortunately, however, (4’) is not sufficient to separately identify σ2ω0
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and σ2ǫ since, as can be seen from the expression on the right hand side, both evolve at the same
rate with z. We therefore also use the covariance restriction,
cov(viz, vi,z+1) = cov((ωiz + ηiz), (ωi,z+1 + ηi,z+1))
= ρ2z+1σ2ω0 +
1− ρ2z
1− ρ2 ρσ
2
ǫ (6
′)
to achieve identification of all four parameters. Notice that (4’) requires, on the left hand side,
estimates of the cross-sectional variance of residual income for each age group z, while (6’) requires
that we use the panel dimension of our data set to estimate the covariances in individuals’ residual
incomes viz over time. Thus, our estimation strategy exploits both the panel dimension and the
repeated cross sections available in the data set. As in Caroll and Samwick (1995), we use residual
income data at the individual level to obtain unbiased estimators of the terms on the left hand
side of (4’) and (6’). Specifically, v2iz and vizvi,z+1 serve as as individual level ”observations” of
the variance and covariance terms on the left hand sides of (4’) and (6’) respectively. We estimate
our system of two equations ((4’) and (6’)) using a simultaneous, non-linear, seemingly unrelated
regressions model (NLSUR) (as described in Gallant, 1975 and Amemiya, 1983). This permits
the estimation of the two non-linear equations, with the cross-equation restrictions implied by the
common parameters, simultaneously and achieves additional estimation efficiency by combining
information from both equations (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2004).15
IV. Data
Using the estimation methodology described in the preceding section, we estimate income mo-
bility parameters using individual income data from Mexico. Specifically, the individual income
data are taken from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU, Mexican National Urban
Employment Survey) which was conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e
Informatica (INEGI, National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information), the primary
statistical agency in Mexico, and the Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social (STPS, Secretariat
15See also Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) for a through discussion of the asymptotic equivalence between esti-
mates obtained using a non-linear-least-squares methodology and the generalized method of moments.
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of Labor and Social Security), Mexico’s Labor Ministry.
Until recently, the ENEU was the primary survey instrument for collecting earnings and em-
ployment data in Mexico. The survey is sampled to be representative geographically and by social
strata (see INEGI 2000). The basic sampling unit is the dwelling. Demographic information is
collected on the household (households) occupying each dwelling. Subsequently, an employment
questionnaire is administered for each individual aged 12 and above in the household on position
in the household, level of education (years of schooling), age and sex as well as standard measures
related to participation in the labor market: occupation, hours worked, employment conditions,
search and earnings. Importantly, the ENEU is constructed as a rotating panel, where individuals
are surveyed every quarter for a total of five quarters.16 Worker earnings include overall earnings
in the individual’s principal occupation from fixed salary payments, hourly or daily wages, piece-
meal work, commissions, tips and self employment earnings. The ENEU, in its modern form, has
employed a consistent survey instrument from 1987 to 2004; it is thus one of very few long-running
surveys with a panel dimension in the developing world. In our study, we are able to use this 18
year span comprising a total of 72 quarters of data.17
We note that while the ENEU survey records employment information on all members of the
household above 12 years old, for younger workers employment is generally transient and time is
often divided among schooling, unpaid support to the household and paid work. Similarly, much
later in life, work again becomes more transient. In our analysis, we focus on individuals between
the ages 20 and 65.
16In each round of the rotating panel, the questionnaire records absent members, adds any new members who
have joined the household, and records any changes in schooling that have taken place. If none of the original group
of household members is found to be living in the dwelling unit in the follow-up survey, the household is recorded as
a new household. The interviewers do not track households that move, so they leave the panel. Rates of attrition
are comparable to other developing countries (See Antman and McKenzie 2007).
17Since 2004, the ENEU has been replaced by the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo (ENOE, Survey
of Occupation and Employment) in 2005. Unfortunately, however, the ENOE instrument differs from ENEU in
important ways that make it impossible to match the surveys with confidence.
10
V. Results
As discussed in the previous section, our estimation methodology proceeds in two steps. As in
Carroll and Samwick (1995), we first use individual data to estimate a Mincer earnings regression.
In a second step, the residuals from the Mincer regression are used to estimate income mobility
parameters using (4’) and (6’). Table 2 reports the estimates from the first stage earnings regression
using the ENEU data described in the preceding section. Our estimates are consistent with earlier
findings in the literature. Specifically, earnings increase, but at a decreasing rate, with education.
Further, earnings increase with potential experience (age) up until the age of 44 after which they
decrease again. Males appear to earn 31 percent more than women, conditional on the other
covariates.18
We use next the residuals from the earnings regression, vit, to construct individual level “ob-
servations” of income variances v2it and covariances vitvi,t+1,
19 that are to be used on the left hand
side of equations (4’) and (6’) to estimate the income mobility parameters. The age profile of the
constructed variance and covariance measures are indicated in Figures 1 and 2, which are generated
by regressing the two variables respectively on a complete set of age and time dummies and then
plotting the former against age (see Deaton and Paxson, 1994, for a similar exercise). Consistent
with equations (4’) and (6’), the accumulation of persistent shocks, σ2ǫ , as age increases, gives both
relationships an upward slope, albeit at rates differing by a factor of ρ.
Estimation results from the joint estimation of (4’) and (6’), as described in the previous section,
yield the parameter estimates listed in Table 3. The first column presents the results using the full
sample, while the second column provides results obtained using data from just those households
that enter the sample in the first quarter of each year. Our estimates of the income mobility
parameters are also in line with those obtained previously in the literature. The autoregressive
18For robustness we have also run alternate earnings specifications, allowing for both more and less temporal
variation, by allowing all parameters to vary in each time period, and separately by constraining even the constant
to be invariant across periods (unlike in the specification reported on in Table 2, which includes year fixed effects).
The results do not change appreciably.
19Note that vt+1 denotes individual i’s residual one year (four quarters) after t
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component, ρ, is estimated to be 0.977, which suggests that persistent shocks to income experienced
by any individual i will indeed last a long time. The estimated variance of transitory shocks
to income σ2η = 0.202, is significantly larger than the variance of persistent shocks to income
σ2ǫ = 0.015. This is not surprising given that the transitory shocks in our specification subsume
measurement error in income, which we expect to be quite large in our data set.20 Finally, the
estimated variance in initial incomes, σ2ω0 = 0.104. As the results in the second column indicate,
the estimates are not appreciably different with the restricted sample of households who enter the
survey in just the first quarter of each year.
Given our estimates of the income parameters, we can use expressions (7) to analyze mobility
patterns. In particular, we can compute how much the individual parameters contribute to overall
mobility. Table 4 shows that mobility in residual income across 1 year is 0.67 and it increases as
the span of measurement increases to 10 years (0.76), and 25 years (0.84). The reasons behind the
surprisingly high 1 year mobility level, and relatively modest increases thereafter become clearer in
the next rows which set to zero each of the key parameters and calculate the resulting change in
mobility. Notice, first, that 1-year mobility falls by a full 90 percent if we set σ2η, which represents
transitory shocks and measurement error to zero. As we have noted earlier, our analysis proceeds
under the understanding that individuals can largely smooth such transitory shocks through own
savings and these shocks are therefore limited welfare impact. By contrast, “bad mobility” σ2ǫ due
to risk and “good” mobility due to convergence, ρ) account for roughly 1 percent each across 1
year.21
The relative impact of these parameters clearly changes as we increase the span over which
we are measuring mobility. At 25 years, setting transitory shocks to zero reduces mobility by a
still large, but much reduced by 23 percent (as transitory shocks are, by definition, transitory and
mobility over this duration is driven to a greater extent by the cumulative effect of persistent shocks
experienced by individuals over this period). By contrast, mobility due to persistent risk accounts
20See Antman and McKenzie (2007) for a discussion of measurement error and mobility using this data.
21Note that since mobility is highly non-linear in its underlying parameters, measured mobility does not decompose
additively into its component parts.
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for 7.4 percent and due to convergence, to 8.6 percent. Having identified which parameters have
the largest influence on measured mobility, we now turn to their relative contribution to welfare.
VI. Welfare Analysis
The voluminous literature on consumption and saving with individual income risk and incom-
plete insurance markets has generated a number of insights.22 One important insight is that workers
can effectively self-insure against transitory income shocks through borrowing or own saving, and
that the effect of these shocks on equilibrium prices and quantities are relatively small.23 A second
important insight of this literature is that very persistent or fully permanent income shocks have
substantial effects on consumption and welfare even if individual households have own savings, but
no or only limited access to insurance markets. Indeed, when labor income is the main source of
income and labor income shocks are highly persistent, we would expect that consumption responds
(almost) one-for-one to labor income shocks. This point has been made more formally by Constan-
tinides and Duffie (1996) and Krebs (2007) using dynamic general equilibrium exchange models
with incomplete markets. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) only consider the case in which income
follows a random walk (ρ = 1), but Krebs (2007) also analyzes an extension with ρ < 1 and costs of
financial intermediation that introduce a spread between the borrowing rate and the lending rate.
In this section, we discuss the main ideas and results of the model analyzed in Krebs (2007).
VI.1. Consumption
The model features long-lived, risk-averse workers with homothetic preferences who make consump-
tion/saving choices in the face of uninsurable income shocks. Workers’ preferences over consumption
plans, {cit}, allow for a time-additive expected utility representation with one-period utility func-
tion of the CRRA-type, where in this paper we confine attention to the log-utility case (degree of
22See, for example, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Yaron (2009) for a recent survey.
23See, for example Aiyagari (1994) and Heaton and Lucas (1996) for quantitative work and Levine and Zame (2002)
for a theoretical argument. Kubler and Schmedders (2002) show that welfare cost of “transitory” labor income shocks
are non-negligible, but the labor income process they consider has ρ = 0.5.
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relative risk aversion of 1):
U({cit}|ωi0) = E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtlncit|ωi0
]
. (9)
Workers maximize expected lifetime utility subject to a sequential budget constraint that allows
them to transfer wealth across periods through saving (or borrowing). The model is an exchange
economy with endogenous interest rate (general equilibrium).
In order to apply the equilibrium characterization result of Krebs (2007), we need to introduce
three modification of the labor income process (1). First, we abstract from ex-ante heterogeneity
and time-effects: µt(xit) = µ. For simplicity, we set µ = 0 so that the mean of labor income
(aggregate labor income) is normalized to one (see below). Second, measurement error should
not enter into the worker’s budget constraint, and the part of η that represents measurement
error should therefore be omitted. Further, as we have argued before, the part of η that is due
to true income shocks is expected to have only small effects on equilibrium consumption and
welfare. To simplify the analysis, we neglect these small effects of transitory income shocks and
set lnyit = ωit, where {ωit} is an AR(1) process as in the previous section. Third, the distribution
of the innovation term, ǫ, and the distribution of initial income, ω0, include a mean-adjustment:
ǫ ∼ N(−σ2ǫ /2, σ2ǫ ) and ω0 ∼ N(−σ2ω0/2, σ2ω0). This adjustment is necessary to ensure that σ2ǫ and
σ2ω0 can be interpreted as uncertainty parameters (see below).
24
Our specification of the labor income process implies that
E[yi,t+1|It] = yρit (10)
var[yi,t+1|It] = eσ2ǫ − 1
E[yi0] = 1
var[y0] = e
σ2ω0
24The main part of the analysis in Krebs (2007) deals with the random walk case, but the Appendix discusses the
extension to labor income shocks that are not fully permanent. The labor income process specified in the Appendix
of Krebs (2007) is equivalent to an AR(1) process with an innovation term that has finite support, which rules out
the case of a normal distribution. One way to apply the results of Krebs (2007) to the present analysis is to truncate
all normal distributions at an arbitrarily large point, and to think of all equilibrium results as approximate results
for which the approximation error can be made arbitrarily small.
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where It denote the information available at time t. Thus, increases in either σǫ or σω0 increase
the variance of labor income without any change in the (conditional) mean – they lead to a mean-
preserving spread. In other words, the two parameters measure risk/uncertainty.25
If ρ = 1 and labor income follows a random walk, then the equilibrium interest rate will adjust
so that individual workers will optimally decide to set consumption equal to labor income (see
Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Krebs (2007) for details). If ρ is not equal to one, but not
too far away from one, then a sufficiently large difference in the borrowing and lending rate (cost of
financial intermediation) will ensure that in equilibrium households still choose to set consumption
equals labor income (see the Appendix of Krebs (2007) for details). In short, in equilibrium we
have cit = yit, that is, consumption and labor income move one-for-one.
VI.2. Mobility and Welfare
Using cit = yit = ωit and the income specification discussed above, we can evaluate the expected
lifetime utility (9) of an individual with initial income ωi0. Taking the expectation over ωi0 yields
social welfare, W , where we assume that each individual household is assigned equal weight in
the social welfare function. In other words, social welfare is the expected lifetime utility from an
ex ante point of view when the initial condition, ω0, is not yet known (veil of ignorance). More
formally, we have
W = E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtlncit
]
(11)
= E
[
E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtlncit|ω0
]]
= E
[
− β
(1− β)(1− βρ)
σ2ǫ
2
+
1
1− βρω0
]
= − β
(1− β)(1− βρ)
σ2ǫ
2
− 1
1− βρ
σ2ω0
2
25The n-period ahead variances, var[yi,t+n|It], in general depend on σ
2
ǫ for n ≥ 2 if ρ < 1. We can correct for
these “higher-order” effects without essentially changing the main results of the paper. More precisely, a modified
version of the welfare formula (.), which adjusts for the change in mean income, yields quantitative results that are
very close to the results reported here. Details are available on request.
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The formula (11) shows how social welfare depends on the various income parameters and the
preference parameter β. In particular, (11) shows that an increase in uncertainty, either about
initial conditions or about future labor market conditions, will reduce social welfare. Further, an
increase in ρ increases uncertainty about lifetime income, and therefore reduces welfare:
W
∂σ2ω0
< 0 ,
W
∂σ2ǫ
< 0 ,
W
∂ρ
< 0 (12)
In order to express welfare changes in economically meaningful units, we calculate the corre-
sponding change in consumption in each period and possible future state that is necessary to com-
pensate the worker for the change in uncertainty. For example, suppose we compare two economies,
one with income parameters (σ2ω0 , σ
2
ǫ , ρ) and one with income parameters (σˆ
2
ω0
, σˆ2ǫ , ρˆ). We then de-
fine the consumption-equivalent welfare change, ∆, of moving from (σ2ω0 , σ
2
ǫ , ρ) to (σˆ
2
ω0
, σˆ2ǫ , ρˆ) as
E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtln (cit(1 + ∆))
]
= E
[
∞∑
t=0
βtlncˆit
]
, (13)
where c is consumption in the first economy and cˆ is consumption in the second economy. Using
the definition (13) and the welfare formula (11), we find:
ln(1 + ∆) =
β
(1− βρˆ)
σˆ2ǫ
2
+
(1− β)
(1− βρˆ)
σˆ2ω0
2
(14)
− β
(1− βρ)
σ2ǫ
2
− (1− β)
1− βρ
σ2ω0
2
As mentioned before, measurement error and transitory shocks have (almost) no effect on wel-
fare. In contrast, the effect of the other two mobility parameters, σǫ and ρ, turn out be quite
substantial. For example, based on the welfare formula (14) and an annual discount factor of
β = 0.96, a value that is standard in the macro-economic literature (for example, Cooley and
Prescott, 1995), we find that removing all “bad mobility”, σ2ǫ = 0, leads to a welfare gain of about
12 percent of lifetime consumption. Using the same discount factor, the welfare cost of removing
all “good mobility”, ρ = 1, is equal to 8 percent of lifetime consumption, again a significant welfare
effect. Finally, removing both “good” and “ bad” mobility at the same time, σ2ǫ = 0 and ρ = 1,
leads to a net welfare gain of about 10 percent of lifetime consumption. The last result shows that
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the welfare formula (14) is highly non-linear and that the positive welfare effect of catching-up,
ρ < 1, is closely linked to the presence or absence of persistent income shocks, ǫ. Calculations with
other values of β yield similar results as indicated in Table 5.
In sum, the application of our general framework to Mexico provides striking results. The
parameter that accounts for the largest part of measured mobility, ση, has (almost) no effect on
welfare, and the two parameters that have large effects on welfare, σǫ and ρ, have only a modest
contribution to measured mobility, and least over small time durations. Clearly, our welfare results
depend on the choice of preference parameters, namely the degree of risk aversion and the degree of
impatience (discounting). However, by using a logarithmic utility function we have already chosen
a relatively low degree of (relative) risk aversion, namely one, and any increase in the degree of
risk aversion would only increase the welfare effects. Further, lowering the discount factor β will
lower the welfare effects, but for a wide range of values of β the welfare effects remain substantial
and the ranking of the different parameters remains the same (see table 5). In short, our welfare
results are valid for a wide range of preference parameters.
VII. Conclusions
This paper develops an analytically tractable framework linking individual income dynamics,
social mobility and welfare. This analytical framework that we develop has the merit that the links
between different determinants of income mobility and social welfare are drawn out in a simple
and transparent manner − allowing for a clearer analytical and quantitative discussion of these
interrelated concepts than has generally been possible in the past. In particular, we discuss in
detail how different determinants of measured income mobility (shocks to income, and convergence
forces, for instance) may have quite different implications for welfare. This implies that two societies
with the same initial distribution of income and the same level of measured income mobility may be
characterized by quite different levels of social welfare. Decomposing the determinants of mobility
is thus shown to be crucial from the standpoint of welfare evaluation.
An important strength of the proposed framework is its empirical implementability. The quan-
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titative evaluation of mobility and welfare in our context entails the estimation of income process
parameters may be achieved using combined cross sectional and longitudinal data on individual in-
comes and relatively straightforward econometric techniques. The results from Mexico are striking.
Most of measured mobility is estimated to be driven by transitory shocks to income and is there-
fore (almost) welfare neutral. Only a small part of mobility (i.e., mobility in permanent income) is
driven by either social-welfare-reducing persistent income shocks or welfare-enhancing catching-up
of low-income individuals with high-income individuals. Despite their small contributions to mea-
sured mobility, the implications for welfare are large. Decomposing mobility into its fundamental
components is thus crucial from the standpoint of welfare evaluation.
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Figure 1: Variance of Unpredicted Part of Earnings vs. Age (1987-2003)
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Note: Variance is the coefficient on age from a regression of the Mincer residual squared on age and year dummies. Estimates
from Mexican Urban Employment Survey using individuals age 20-65. 5% confidence intervals
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Figure 2: Covariance of Unpredicted Part of Earnings across 5 Quarters vs. Age (1987-2003)
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Note: Covariance is the coefficient on age from a regression of the covariance of the Mincer residual in quarter 1 vs. quarter
5 on age and year dummies. Estimates from Mexican Urban Employment Survey using individuals age 20-65. 5% confidence
intervals.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: 1987-2003
Mean Sd Min Max
Age 36.271 10.626 20 65
Schooling 10.624 5.460 0 22
Sex 0.737 0.440 0 1
Note: Based on the Mexican Monthly Urban Employment Survey, 1987-2003 using individuals between 20 and 65 years of age.
Age and schooling in years.
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Table 2: Mincer Regression
Coef Sd t p > |t|
Cons 3.699 0.009 422.450 0.000
Sex 0.310 0.002 191.140 0.000
Sch 0.077 0.001 143.160 0.000
Sch2 -0.001 0.000 -45.380 0.000
Age
21 0.044 0.005 8.730 0.000
22 0.088 0.005 17.540 0.000
23 0.127 0.005 25.740 0.000
24 0.173 0.005 34.570 0.000
25 0.208 0.005 41.530 0.000
26 0.242 0.005 47.780 0.000
27 0.268 0.005 52.450 0.000
28 0.288 0.005 56.510 0.000
29 0.309 0.005 60.240 0.000
30 0.328 0.005 64.350 0.000
31 0.348 0.005 66.740 0.000
32 0.360 0.005 68.540 0.000
33 0.370 0.005 71.270 0.000
34 0.382 0.005 71.890 0.000
35 0.389 0.005 73.360 0.000
36 0.391 0.005 73.160 0.000
37 0.407 0.005 75.150 0.000
38 0.422 0.005 77.940 0.000
39 0.421 0.005 76.910 0.000
40 0.426 0.006 77.270 0.000
41 0.442 0.006 76.630 0.000
42 0.451 0.006 77.750 0.000
43 0.448 0.006 76.700 0.000
44 0.459 0.006 74.430 0.000
45 0.455 0.006 74.150 0.000
46 0.450 0.006 70.690 0.000
47 0.452 0.007 66.900 0.000
48 0.441 0.007 64.660 0.000
49 0.430 0.007 61.210 0.000
50 0.434 0.007 60.680 0.000
51 0.431 0.008 56.920 0.000
52 0.430 0.008 54.200 0.000
53 0.423 0.008 52.360 0.000
54 0.420 0.009 48.510 0.000
55 0.398 0.009 44.750 0.000
56 0.400 0.009 42.730 0.000
57 0.393 0.010 39.600 0.000
58 0.367 0.011 34.870 0.000
59 0.356 0.011 32.000 0.000
60 0.322 0.011 28.640 0.000
61 0.307 0.012 24.860 0.000
62 0.302 0.014 22.000 0.000
63 0.286 0.015 19.640 0.000
64 0.309 0.016 19.460 0.000
65 0.247 0.016 15.360 0.000
Year and wave dummies Yes
N 782179
R2 Adj 0.595
Note: Regression of log income on sex, age as a dummy variable, schooling, schooling square and a year time specific dummy
and a dummy for whether the data correspond to the first period or the fifth. Data are pooled across all years. Based on the
Mexican Monthly Urban Employment Survey, 1987-2003, using individuals between 20 and 65 years of age.
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Table 3: Estimation of Mobility Parameters
Full Sample Restricted
ρ 0.977*** 0.976***
(0.0019) (0.0037)
σ2ω 0.104*** 0.104***
(0.0038) (0.0068)
σ2ǫ 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.0008) (0.0016)
σ2η 0.203*** 0.217***
(0.0039) (0.0073)
Time Dummies Yes Yes
N 387460 99570
Note: Estimation using Non-linear SUR estimation. Dependent variables: Eq 1 variance, Eq 2 covariance. Variance calculated
as the square of the residual of the mincer regression. Covariance as the covariance of the residual in the first quarter observed
with that of the fifth quarter. ρ represents the autoregressive coefficient or convergence parameter. σ2ω represents the variance of
the initial distribution of income. σ2ǫ represents the variance of permanent shocks. σ
2
η represents the variance of the transitory or
measurement error component of income. A complete and separate set of time dummies is included in each equation. Estimates
using the Mexican Monthly Urban Employment Survey, 1987-2003, using individuals between 20 and 65 years of age. Column
1 uses all observations. Column 2 just those beginning Q1 of each year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4: Mobility Analysis
Span of measurement (t, in years)
1 10 25
Actual mobility 0.674 0.763 0.846
% ∆ if:
ρ = 0 -0.77 -5.2 -8.6
σ2ǫ=0 -1.2 -6.6 -7.4
σ2η=0 -89.7 -45.7 -23.3
Note: Table shows the percentage decline in mobility as component parameters are individually set to zero relative to actual
mobility calculated from equation (7) using parameters estimated in Table 3 based on the Mexican Monthly Urban Employment
Survey, 1987-2003. ρ represents the autoregressive coefficient or convergence parameter. σ2ǫ represents the variance of permanent
shocks. σ2η represents the variance of the transitory or measurement error component of income. Mobility is calculated across
a span, t, of 1, 10 and 25 years.
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Table 5: Welfare Analysis
σ2ǫ = 0 ρ = 1 σ
2
ǫ = 0 and ρ = 1
% ∆ if:
β = 0.96 12.56 -8.04 10.5
β = 0.95 10.64 -5.82 8.91
β = 0.94 9.21 -4.45 7.72
β = 0.90 5.87 -2.05 4.93
Note: Table shows the percentage change in welfare calculated measured as a percent of lifetime consumption as σ2ǫ , the variance
of permanent shocks, is set to 0 (no income risk) and ρ, the convergence parameter, is set to one (no convergence). β is the
annual discount factor. Welfare is calculated using equations (11) and (14) and the estimated values in Table 3 using the
Mexican Monthly Urban Employment Survey 1987-2003.
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